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
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
# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONTENTS

1. **INDONESIAN NATIONAL PARTY MAY ACCEPT  
COALITION WITH COMMUNISTS**

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
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Current Intelligence Bulletin


Page 2

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# 1. **INDONESIAN NATIONAL PARTY MAY ACCEPT COALITION WITH COMMUNISTS**



The Indonesian National Party executive committee has voted 23 to 18 in favor of a coalition with the Communist Party (PKI), the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and the Islamic League (PSII), according to Prime Minister Harahap who is a member of the Masjumi. This reported decision would make Communist participation in the next cabinet a definite possibility. The Nationalists have in the past thought only in terms of Communist support in parliament.

Harahap told an American embassy official it was not clear whether the NU and the PSII, both of which are Moslem parties, would participate in such a coalition. He said these two parties are "real unknowns" in the present situation and their final stand would be based to a large extent on the desires of President Sukarno.

The position of the NU, which has stoutly opposed Communist participation in the government, may be affected by Sukarno's public statement of 15 January endorsing co-operation among nationalist, Marxist, and Moslem elements.

The Harahap cabinet's chances of survival have considerably decreased as a result of the withdrawal of the NU and the small PSII from the coalition government on 19 January. Another minor party is considering withdrawal, which would reduce the government's majority in parliament to the point at which the usual abstentions in any vote of confidence would probably give victory to the opposition.



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